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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Corey Steven Kubat appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his petition 
for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 Kubat was charged in the underlying criminal case with possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver and a “persistent violator” sentencing 
enhancement.  (R., pp.38-41.)  A jury found Kubat guilty of both charges and the district 
court sentenced Kubat to a unified term of 18 years with eight years fixed.  (R., pp.49-
52.)  Kubat filed a Rule 35, I.C.R., motion for reduction of sentence (see R., p.81), which 
was denied (R., pp.80-81).  Kubat filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his Rule 35 
motion, which was also denied.  (R., pp.86-96.)  Kubat appealed from his judgment of 
conviction (R., pp.57-60), which the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed in State v. Kubat, 
158 Idaho 661, 350 P.3d 1038 (Ct. App. 2015).  Kubat’s petition for review was denied 
on July 8, 2015.  Id.   
 Kubat filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and a supporting affidavit, 
presenting approximately 15 claims, mostly asserting ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  (R., pp.4-16.)  The district court granted Kubat’s request for appointed 
counsel.  (R., pp.17-20, 28-29.)  After the state filed an Answer (R., pp.34-37), the court 
took judicial notice of several documents, including a transcript of the jury trial (R., 
pp.109-112).  The court entered a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Certain Claims, giving 
Kubat 30 days’ notice that, unless he filed a response, all but one claim would be 
dismissed.  (R., pp.113-131.)  Two months later, after not receiving any additional 
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information from Kubat to support his claims, the court entered an Order Dismissing 
Certain Claims (R., pp.140-157), dismissing “all claims except for Claim 1(i) – that 
counsel told him he was not allowed to take the witness stand in his own defense.” (R., 
p.156.)  The court set an evidentiary hearing in regard to that claim.   
 At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing, when asked by the court whether 
Kubat’s claim was a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or some other 
constitutional violation, Kubat’s attorney explained that the claim was based on Kubat’s 
constitutional right to testify on his own behalf.  (Tr., p.4, Ls.9-16.)  After the evidentiary 
hearing, in which Kubat and his trial counsel testified, the court entered an Order 
Denying Relief (R., pp.160-163), ruling that Kubat “failed to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was deprived of the right to testify in his own 
behalf” (R., p.162).  The court entered a Final Judgment dismissing Kubat’s petition for 
post-conviction relief (R., pp.164-165), and Kubat filed a timely notice of appeal (R., 
pp.166-169).  
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ISSUE 
Kubat states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err in denying post-conviction relief given Mr. Kubat 
was never advised that he had a constitutional right to testify and the 
ultimate authority to decide whether to testify, regardless of counsel’s 
advice? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Kubat failed to show error in the district court’s order, following an 
evidentiary hearing, dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Kubat Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Order, Following An Evidentiary 
Hearing, Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
 
A. Introduction 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court ruled that Kubat failed to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence presented that his constitutional due process right 
to testify at trial was violated by his trial attorney.  (R., pp.160-163.)  On appeal, Kubat 
contends he should have been granted relief because the record shows he was not 
advised by counsel that he had an absolute right to testify at trial. (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.9-13.)  Kubat’s argument fails. 
Kubat’s trial counsel cannot be considered a “state actor”; therefore, he has no 
basis to claim his constitutional due process right to testify at trial was violated by “state 
action” as required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Although the 
district court did not deny the claim on that ground, its correct ruling should nevertheless 
be upheld on that basis.  See State v. White, 102 Idaho 924, 925, 644 P.2d 318, 319 
(1982); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001).   Even assuming 
his trial counsel was a state actor under the Fourteenth Amendment, the district court 
correctly concluded Kubat “failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he was deprived of the right to testify in his own behalf.”  (R., p.162.)  Finally, even 
if Kubat’s due process right to testify at trial was violated, such error is harmless. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act are civil, where 
there is competent and substantial evidence to support a decision made after an 
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evidentiary hearing on an application for post-conviction relief, that decision will not be 
disturbed on appeal.  Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 826 P.2d 1337 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 
C. Because Kubat’s Trial Counsel Was Not A “State Actor,” The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause Does Not Apply 
 
 Kubat argues that his constitutional due process rights were violated because his 
trial counsel, a public defender, did not advise him that he had an absolute right to 
testify at trial.1  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-13.)  Because Kubat’s trial counsel was not a 
“state actor,” his conduct could not have violated Kubat’s Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process right to testify at trial.  State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, --- , 383 P.3d 1249, 
1255 (2016). 
The failure of a defendant to testify may be examined in post-conviction either as 
a claim of deprivation of a constitutional right, or as a claim of ineffective assistance of 
                                            
1  Kubat’s argument is based on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  However, “the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause applies 
only to the federal government.”  Abbott v. Reinke, 2012 WL 3191372 at *5 (D. Idaho 
2012) (quoting Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008)); see Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979) (“In numerous decisions, this Court ‘has held that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the Federal Government to 
deny equal protection of the laws.’”).  Because Kubat’s trial attorney was not a federal 
actor, Kubat has failed to state a claim for violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
 
 In State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009), the Idaho 
Supreme Court made clear that the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense flows 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, stating: 
 
 The right to present a defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and made applicable to the states 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 
1019, 1023 (1967). “This right is a fundamental element of due process of 
law.” Id. The right to present a defense includes the right to offer testimony 
of witnesses, compel their attendance, and to present the defendant’s 
version of the facts “to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.” Id. 
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counsel.  Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 706, 274 P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(citations omitted).  At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the district court asked 
Kubat’s attorney, “is this specifically a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or some 
other constitutional violation?”  (Tr., p.4, Ls.9-11.)  Kubat’s attorney answered, “Your 
Honor, my understanding is that would be a constitutional claim.  The defendant has a 
constitutional right to testify in their own behalf.  I think that’s where – by my reading of 
the case, I think that’s where it lies.”  (Tr., p.4, Ls.12-16.)  In its order denying Kubat 
post-conviction relief following the evidentiary hearing, the district court reiterated that, 
“[a]t the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel clarified that the claim was not one for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, but rather was based upon a direct constitutional violation – the 
deprivation of his right to testify in his own behalf.”  (R., p.161.)   
Where the issue is viewed as a deprivation of a constitutional right, the defendant 
bears the burden of establishing that he was deprived of a constitutional right and the 
state bears the burden of showing that the deprivation was harmless.  Rossignol, 
152 Idaho at 704, 274 P.3d at 5 (citing State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 522, 708 P.2d 
921, 927 (Ct. App. 1985)).  Because Kubat’s trial counsel was not a “state actor,” Kubat 
cannot show that his trial counsel deprived him of his constitutional due process right to 
testify at trial.  In State v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 643, 649, 977 P.2d 905, 911 (Ct. App. 
1999), the Idaho Court of Appeals explained:  
 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in part: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”  Private action is immune from 
the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment; it is axiomatic that the state 
must affirmatively take action, in some way, in order to deprive an 
individual of his or her right to due process. Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 359-50, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974). 
See also State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 3, 704 P.2d 333, 335 (1985). 
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Accordingly, when analyzing a due process claim, the court must first 
determine whether there has been state action. Next, the court must 
determine whether that state action deprived the person of a right 
enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
Inasmuch as it is only “state action” that the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
against, the relevant question in Kubat’s case is whether his trial counsel, a public 
defender, was a state actor when he represented Kubat at trial.  That question was 
answered by the United States Supreme Court in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 
324-325 (1981), which held that no state action occurs when an attorney performs the 
traditional functions as counsel to a criminal defendant, to wit: 
 In concluding that Shepard did not act under color of state law in 
exercising her independent professional judgment in a criminal 
proceeding, we do not suggest that a public defender never acts in that 
role. In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 . . . (1980), for example, we found 
that a public defender so acted when making hiring and firing decisions on 
behalf of the State. It may be -- although the question is not present in this 
case -- that a public defender also would act under color of state law while 
performing certain administrative and possibly investigative functions. Cf. 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-431, and n. 33 . . . (1976). And of 
course we intimate no views as to a public defender’s liability for 
malpractice in an appropriate case under state tort law. See Ferri v. 
Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 198 . . . (1979). With respect to Dodson’s § 1983 
claims against Shepard, we decide only that a public defender does not 
act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional 
functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Because it 
was based on such activities, the complaint against Shepard must be 
dismissed. 
 
See Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 466-467 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Polk 
County held that when an assistant public defender is performing the traditional role of 
an attorney for a client, the lawyer is not a state actor.”).  
 Here, it is incontrovertible that during Kubat’s jury trial his attorney was 
“performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding.”  Polk County, 454 U.S at 325.  Regardless of the fact that he was a public 
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defender as opposed to retained counsel, Kubat’s trial counsel was not a “state actor” 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Because no state 
action deprived Kubat of his right to testify at trial, he has failed to meet his burden of 
showing his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to testify at trial was violated by 
trial counsel.   
 
D. Even Assuming Kubat’s Trial Counsel Was A “State Actor,” The District Court 
Correctly Determined That Kubat Failed To Meet His Burden Of Showing His 
Counsel Violated His Constitutional Right To Testify At Trial 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that Kubat’s trial counsel was a “state actor” for purposes 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process right to testify at trial, the district court 
correctly dismissed his claim following an evidentiary hearing.     
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which the claim is based.  I.C.R. 
57(c); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 70(2010).  At an evidentiary 
hearing, the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters within the province of the trial 
court.  Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988).  The 
district court’s factual findings will not be disturbed if “supported by substantial, even if 
conflicting, evidence in the record.”  Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 
941, 943 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (1983)).  
On review of an order denying post-conviction relief, the lower court’s decision that the 
burden of proof has not been met is entitled to great weight, and a finding that a party 
has failed to prove his claim will not be set aside unless that finding is clearly erroneous.  
Larkin, 115 Idaho at 74, 764 P.2d at 441. 
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After the evidentiary hearing, the district court entered an Order Denying Relief, 
first setting out the general relevant law, including: (1) every defendant has a 
fundamental right to testify on his own behalf, citing Kuehl v. State, 145 Idaho 607, 611, 
181 P.3d 533, 537 (Ct. App. 2008); and (2) although counsel may advise a defendant 
about the propriety of testifying, the defendant has ultimate authority over that decision, 
citing State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689, 690, 778 P.2d 811, 812 (Ct. App. 1989).  (R., 
p.161.)  The court also explained that the defendant bears the burden of showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was deprived of a constitutional right, and the 
state then bears the burden of showing the deprivation was harmless.  (Id. (citing 
Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704, 274 P.3d at 5 and Darbin, 109 Idaho at 522, 708 P.2d at 
927).)  Another requirement for showing a due process violation of a defendant’s right to 
testify at trial was highlighted in Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 709, 274 P.3d at 10 (emphasis 
added), which explained: 
We reiterate that, pursuant to [State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689, 778 P.2d 
811 (Ct. App. 1989)], a defendant may not be found to have waived his or 
her right to testify at trial unless the defendant was aware that he or she 
not only had such right, but also the ultimate right to decide whether to 
testify regardless of counsel’s advice.[2] 
                                            
2  Cf. U.S. v. Swisher, 790 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1231-32 (D. Idaho 2011), aff’d, 771 F.3d 
514 (9th Cir. 2014), and aff’d, 585 Fed. Appx. 605 (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished), on reh’g 
en banc, 811 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 2016), and rev’d on other grounds, 811 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 
2016), which explained: 
 
As noted in [United States v. Pino–Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 1999)], 
the failure to testify should “not be raised as an afterthought after 
conviction.” Id. at 1096. Rather, [a] defendant who wants to reject his 
attorney’s advice and take the stand may do so “by insisting on testifying, 
speaking to the court, or discharging his lawyer.” When a defendant 
remains “silent in the face of his attorney’s decision not to call him as a 
witness,” he waives the right to testify. Id. at 1094–95 (internal citations 
omitted). 
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 The district court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law (with 
bracketed references to the record added): 
 Petitioner testified that he had a conversation with his attorney 
about his right to testify, and his attorney expressed concerns that he 
would perjure himself.  [Tr., p.8, Ls.19-22.]  His testimony implied that he 
went along with the advice not to testify because others told him he should 
do whatever his attorney told him to do.  [Tr., p.9, Ls.1-5.]  He further 
stated that he did not remember either his attorney or the Court telling him 
that it was ultimately his decision whether or not to testify, but that had he 
been so informed, he wanted to testify.  [Tr., p.9, Ls.6-13.]  
  
 Scott Gatewood, Petitioner’s trial counsel, testified on behalf of the 
State.  He stated that he discussed with Petitioner the problems that could 
arise if Petitioner testified, including the fact that his statements during a 
change of plea hearing could be used to impeach him.  [Tr., p.13, L.17 – 
p.14, L.12.]  They also discussed the issue of perjury because those 
statements were inconsistent with Petitioner’s other statements.  [Tr., 
p.15, Ls.4-15.]  Mr. Gatewood further testified that he and Petitioner had 
several discussions, including while the trial was ongoing, about the issue 
of Petitioner testifying.[3]  [Tr., p.18, L.17 – p.19, L.8.]  Most importantly, 
Mr. Gatewood stated that he never told Petitioner he could not testify, he 
merely advised against it, but that had Petitioner asked, he would have 
been allowed to testify.  [Tr., p.18, Ls.9-11; p.19, Ls.13-23.]  He further 
noted that Petitioner never asked or strongly urged him to let Petitioner 
testify; rather, Mr. Gatewood thought they were on the same page.  [Tr., 
p.19, Ls.9-18.] 
 
 Based upon the testimony presented and the record in its entirety, 
the Court finds that defense counsel advised Petitioner against testifying 
                                            
3  Although not presented at the evidentiary hearing, Kubat appears to have initialed a 
provision in his Guilty Plea Advisory which informed him of his right to testify, to wit: 
 
5. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial.  A jury trial is a 
court hearing to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the 
charge(s) brought against you.  In a jury trial, you have the right to 
present evidence in your defense and to testify in your own 
defense.  The state must convince each and every one of the jurors 
of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to a 
speedy and public jury trial.  CK    .  
 
(R., p.43 (emphasis added).)   
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in his own behalf, and Petitioner acted in accordance with that advice. 
There is no evidence that Petitioner asked to testify and had his request 
refused or that his desire and/or attempt to testify were otherwise 
impeded. As such, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was deprived of the right to testify 
in his own behalf.  Petitioner is therefore not entitled to the relief sought. 
 
(R., pp.161-162.)   
 Kubat’s trial counsel also testified during the evidentiary hearing that, when he 
was having discussions with Kubat, “it was in the context of pretty [sic] aware that he 
had the ability to testify if he really wanted to because we were just making the 
discussion whether he should or shouldn’t.”  (Tr., p.20, L.25 – p.21, L.3 (emphasis 
added).)   
 Neither Kubat nor his trial counsel could recall whether counsel specifically 
advised Kubat that he had an absolute right to testify at trial.  Therefore, Kubat failed to 
prove he was not so advised.  The district court’s findings of fact and the further 
testimony by Kubat’s trial counsel show that Kubat was not only aware that he had a 
right to testify at trial, but that he “had the ability to testify if he really wanted to” (id.) – 
i.e., the decision was ultimately his to make.  Applying the relevant legal standards to 
the evidence presented at Kubat’s evidentiary hearing, the district court correctly ruled, 
albeit on slightly different grounds than argued herein, that Kubat failed to show that his 
trial counsel violated his constitutional due process right to testify at trial.  See White, 
102 Idaho at 925, 644 P.2d at 319; Row, 135 Idaho at 579, 21 P.3d at 901. 
 
E. Even If Kubat’s Due Process Right To Testify At Trial Was Violated, Such Error 
Was Harmless 
 
 The district court denied Kubat’s claim that his due process right to testify at trial 
was violated, and therefore did not address harmless error in its Order Denying Relief.  
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(See R., pp.160-163.)  Nevertheless, the district court’s denial of Kubat’s claim may be 
upheld on that additional basis.4   
 In Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704, 274 P.3d at 5, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
explained: 
 However, if the failure of a defendant to testify is considered in the 
context of deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right, then pursuant 
to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 
(1967), the defendant has the burden to show he or she was deprived of 
the right to testify, and the state must then convince the reviewing court 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not contribute to the 
defendant’s conviction – that it was harmless error.   
 
 The following review of the testimony presented at Kubat’s jury trial shows that 
the state presented overwhelming evidence that he was guilty of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver.  
 On January 30, 2014, Idaho Probation and Parole Agent Michelle Babcock 
conducted a home check on Kubat, one of her probationers.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.124, 
L.13 – p.126, L.1.)5  Living at the residence at the time were Kubat, his girlfriend, Jo Ann 
Gil, and two of Gil’s grandchildren, who were about two and four years old.  (#41675 
Trial Tr., p.126, Ls.2-6.)  When Agent Babcock knocked on the door, the four year old 
opened the door and led her through the house while Agent Babcock announced her 
presence.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.129, Ls.8-12.)   Gil came out of a bedroom that was at 
                                            
4  Although the district court’s Order Denying Relief did not address harmless error, it 
can be upheld on that alternative ground.  See State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448, 450, 
807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate review, the lower court’s ruling must 
be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any theory).   
 
5  The district court took judicial notice of the transcript of the jury trial held October 22-
23, 2013.  (R., pp.109-110.)  That transcript has been included in the documents 
provided on appeal on a compact disk labeled with this case name and number and 
with “CV-16-02748 Audio attached to Order Taking Judicial Notice filed 5-3-16” typed on 
the label.   
13 
 
the rear of the house and shut the door behind her, calling out, “Michelle’s here.”  
(#41675 Trial Tr., p.129, L.14 – p.130, L.3.)  When Agent Babcock asked Gil why she 
did that, Gil said that her friend was in there, and at that time the friend came out of the 
bedroom.6 (#41675 Trial Tr., p.130, Ls.5-9.)  After searching the two women for 
weapons, Kubat’s ex-wife was allowed to leave the residence.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.130, 
Ls.16-25.)  Agent Babcock noticed that the back door to the house, next to the bedroom 
door Gil had come out of, was open approximately four inches.  (#41675 Trial Tr., 
p.129, Ls.18-21; see id., p.147, Ls.8-13.)  
 After searching the two women, Agent Babcock was alerted by Agent Louie 
Whitworth, a law enforcement ranger for the Bureau of Land Management, who was 
with her in the residence, that there “was somebody else coming from the back area of 
the house,” and when she looked, she “saw Mr. Kubat coming from that area.”  (#41675 
Trial Tr., p.132, Ls.13-20; p.135, Ls.20-25; p.142, Ls.5-9.)  Agent Babcock asked Kubat 
where he had been, and he said he was outside chopping wood.  (#41675 Trial Tr., 
p.133, Ls.4-5.)  Agent Babcock had just had a conversation with Gil, who said that 
Kubat was not there, he was gone.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.133, Ls.5-7.)  Agent Babcock 
asked a new officer to do a safety search of Kubat because he “was having trouble 
articulating things to [Agent Babcock]” and “seemed very nervous,” which was not the 
behavior he normally displayed to Agent Babcock.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.133, Ls.9-13.)   
 During the search Kubat became physically noncompliant, and Agent Babcock 
asked Agent Whitworth to detain him for their safety.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.133, Ls.16-
                                            
6  According to Jo Ann Gil’s testimony, the “friend” was Julie Hoffman, Kubat’s ex-wife.  
(#41675 Trial Tr., p.238, Ls.1-13.)  Kubat presented no evidence that Julie Hoffman 
would have known who Agent Babcock was.  
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20.)  When Agent Whitworth tried to place handcuffs on Kubat, he “pushed away and 
ran towards the back door.”  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.133, Ls.20-22; p.135, Ls.20-25; p.147, 
Ls.18-23.)  Agents Babcock and Whitworth pursued Kubat, and after wrestling with him, 
were able to detain him and place handcuffs on him.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.133, L.23 – 
p.134, L.3; p.147, L.25 – p.148, L.4.)  When asked where she believed Kubat “came 
from,” Agent Babcock said, “I believe he came from the back bedroom where Miss Gil 
was located.”  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.134, Ls.4-7.)  
 After detaining Kubat and the arrival of another officer, Agent Babcock and other 
officers searched the residence for “anything involving any criminal activity.”  (#41675 
Trial Tr., p.135, L.17 – p.136, L.12.)  Agent Babcock went into the bedroom that Gil 
came out of, and saw a TV, “tools, auto spray guns, paint guns, power tools” and a 
man’s fedora-type hat sitting on a desk.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.134, Ls.8-17.)  As his 
probation officer since 2012, Agent Babcock was familiar with Kubat’s hobbies, which 
included tinkering on automobiles and motorcycles:  his previous residence “had a shed 
that was filled with mechanic-type tools, spray paints, auto-body-type stuff, items of that 
nature.  He always had a lot of generator power-tool-type things like that.”  (#41675 Trial 
Tr., p.134, L.18 – p.135, L.3.)  Agent Babcock did not see any items that might belong 
to a woman in that room.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.135, Ls. 8-16.)   
 Agent Whitworth did a narcotic search with his drug dog, which “alerted” on a 
desk in the back bedroom where the two women had come from.  (#41675 Trial Tr., 
p.149, L.21 – p.150, L.7.)  Because of the sharp instruments on the floor in that room, 
Agent Whitworth did not search the desk until he finished searching other rooms.  
(#41675 Trial Tr., p.150, Ls.7-11.)  When Agent Whitworth returned and cleared the 
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bedroom, his “dog alerted and came to a final response on that desk.”  (#41675 Trial 
Tr., p.150, L.23 – p.151, L.3.)  Agent Whitworth found two glass pipes – one on top of 
the desk and one inside a drawer – which, through his training and experience, were the 
type commonly used to smoke methamphetamines.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p. 151, L.20 – 
p.153, L.25.)  He also found a butane torch in the room, and explained that such torches 
are commonly used to “heat the meth up while they’re smoking it because it produces a 
hot flame to melt the meth.”  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.154, Ls.1-7.)  
 Deputy Sheriff Bryan Zechmann was sent to Kubat’s residence to assist other 
officers, and was sent to the bedroom where the drug dog had alerted on the desk 
(referring to the room as a “utility room”).  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.180, L.5 – p.182, L.9; 
p.197, L.4 – p.198, L.7.)  Deputy Zechmann found a clear plastic bag on a desk, and 
“inside that clear plastic bag was nine individual baggies of a white crystal substance” 
which was “NARK” tested by Deputy Sheriff Chris Little and found to be presumptive 
positive for methamphetamine.7  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.182, L.12 - p.183, L.17; p.214, L.3 
– p.215, L.8.)   
 Deputy Sheriff Cary Salazar, who had worked with the City-County Narcotics Unit 
for a total of about ten years, was dispatched to Kubat’s residence for the purpose of 
interviewing Kubat.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.158, Ls.8-24; p.159, L.13 - p.160, L.18.)  After 
Deputy Little showed Deputy Salazar the (presumed) methamphetamine that had been 
placed in the trunk of Deputy Little’s car in an evidence bag (#41675 Trial Tr., p.160, 
                                            
7  Although Deputy Zechmann referred to a “NIK” test, Deputy Little, who did the test, 
explained he is trained in both “NARK” and “NIK” testing and he used a “NARK 
methamphetamine test kit” to test for the presumptive presence of methamphetamine.  
(#41675 Trial Tr., p.214, L.13 – p.215, L.8.)  
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L.20 – p.161, L.1), Deputy Salazar talked with Kubat, and testified about that 
conversation as follows: 
A. When I went and spoke to him, I advised him of his Miranda 
warnings first.  And then I spoke to him just to get small talk to start with 
and try to get a rapport with him and everything.  And then I went into if he 
knew what was located in the house and everything, and he said he did.  I 
believe his exact words were he’s fucked.  And then I asked him if he 
would be willing to help himself out.  At the time, I was trying to twist him, 
which is what we do is when somebody’s in trouble, we’ll – to explain 
twisting to somebody, we’ll go speak to them about what they’re in trouble 
for and see if they’re willing to help themselves out by giving me 
information on maybe where they got it or anything in that nature. 
 
Q. What did he say? 
 
A. He would not tell me where he got it from or who he got it from.  He 
did inform me that he knew it was in the house.  I asked him if his wife 
knew anything about it.  He said she did not know of him buying or selling 
any methamphetamine.  
 
(#41675 Trial Tr., p.161, L.6 – p.162, L.1 (emphasis added).) 
 Deputy Salazar testified that he examined a spiral notebook that had been 
placed into evidence in this case.8  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.2-8.)  Based on his 
training and experience, the deputy concluded that the notebook was a “ledger” that 
kept track of ongoing drug transactions.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.163, L.17 – p.164, L.9.)  
Deputy Salazar testified that there are names and “numbers saying owe and paid . . . 
[and] some of the amounts coincide with the current amount of methamphetamine in 
certain quantities.”  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.164, Ls.11-16.)  The deputy explained that a 
“teener” is one-sixteenth of an ounce (or 1.6 – 1.7 grams), which sells “anywhere 
between 110 and 140.”  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.164, Ls.17-25.)  According to Deputy 
Salazar, the amounts in the ledger are similar to the weights of the individual baggies 
                                            
8  The trial record does not reveal where the spiral notebook was originally found. 
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listed on the evidence sheets she reviewed, and the baggies were broken down into 
what “we call teeners for sale.”  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.165, L.25 – p.166, L.17.)  Referring 
to the ledger, the deputy also testified, “there is a statement in here that is dated 10-4 of 
2012 stating that ‘I, Corey S. Kubat’ – Kubat – I don’t remember the pronunciation, sorry 
– stating his name in it.  I don’t know if he wrote it, but it does state his name in it.”  
(#41675 Trial Tr., p.165, Ls.18-24.)  
 Deputy Little testified that he was POST certified, he had a “detention level 2 
certificate,” and he had been in law enforcement for 14 years.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.211, 
L.8 – p.212, L.1.)  Deputy Little was sent to Kubat’s residence to assist with the 
probation and parole search, and collected the nine “individually packaged baggies” that 
were in one big bag, and took them to the Canyon County “crime lab” and then 
“packaged the – each bag separately . . . and weighed it all” at 16.8 grams (including 
packaging materials).  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.186, Ls.9-16; p.212, Ls.2-20; p.215, L.9 – 
p.216, L.24; p.220, L.16 – p.221, L.1.)  In the “utility room/bedroom,” Deputy Little 
located two glass pipes with burnt black residue in them, which, in his training and 
experience, showed they had been used.  (#41675 Tr., p.222, Ls.1-10.)  Deputy 
Zechmann testified that indicators that the two glass pipes had been used are not only 
the burnt residue inside the pipes, but also the “pungent smell” of the pipes, and the 
methamphetamine found on the desk and the torch which would indicate “use” by 
heating up an item.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.3-19.) 
 Deputy Little also found a propane torch which he explained “[m]ost likely was 
used to ignite whatever was put in the pipe.”  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.222, Ls. 5-14.)  When 
asked if, in his training and experience, “someone has multiple packages – individually 
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wrapped packages of a substance, is it for personal use?”, Deputy Little said “[n]o” and 
explained that multiple packages typically indicates “[t]hey’re intending to sell it, 
distribute it.”  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.222, L.20 – p.223, L.2.)  Deputy Little “took the 
evidence to the crime lab, packaged it and then [he] wrote a report.”  (#41675 Trial Tr., 
p.223, Ls.16-17.)        
 Steven Petersen, a criminalist with Canyon County Sheriff’s Office Forensic 
Services, testified that he supervised the drug testing of the evidence submitted in this 
case, and that the nine packets of white crystal substance submitted for testing in 
Kubat’s case were all about 1/6 grams in weight, and “[a]ll nine of the substances tested 
were positive for the presence of methamphetamine.”9  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.200, L.14 – 
p.206, L.4.) 
 Jo Ann Gil testified on behalf of Kubat that she had been his girlfriend for three 
years, and that, on January 30, 2013, she and her grandkids resided at the 2013 
Boehner Road address, and that Kubat had lived there for a week, at most.  (#41675 
Trial Tr., p.232, L.7 – p.233, L.3.)  Gil testified that she was not aware that there was 
any methamphetamine in the house.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.16-18.)  When asked 
whether Kubat frequently used the bedroom/utility room where she and Kubat’s ex-wife 
had been that day, Gil said, “We both do.”  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.268, L.11 – p.269, L.4; 
p.271, Ls.18-20.)   
                                            
9  Mr. Petersen testified that he has a B.S. degree in criminal justice with an emphasis 
on forensic science, and is a certified senior crime scene analyst through the 
International Association of Identification.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.201, Ls.4-15.) 
Mr. Petersen has also received specialized training through drug testing seminars by 
the DEA in Virginia.  (#41675 Trial Tr., p.201, Ls.18-20.)  
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 Based on the testimony presented at trial, this Court should conclude that, even if 
Kubat’s due process right to testify at trial was violated, such error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence proving his guilt was overwhelming 
and his failure to testify did not contribute to his conviction.  
 On appeal, Kubat argues that, had he testified, he could have explained that the 
reason he ran from Agent Whitworth during the probation search was because he did 
not want to get caught with marijuana in his pocket, stating: 
Had [he] testified, as trial counsel noted, he could have explained to the 
jury why he attempted to run when Officer Whitworth started to handcuff 
him.  This would have precluded the state’s argument that his attempt to 
run was proof that he knew about the methamphetamine, pipes, torch, and 
ledger in the house.   
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)   
 Apart from the unwarranted assumption that such testimony would have 
“precluded” the state’s argument about Kubat’s flight and consciousness of guilt,10 
nowhere in the evidentiary hearing transcript is there testimony that Kubat said he ran 
because he had marijuana in his pocket.  During that hearing, Kubat did not testify 
about how he would have testified at trial at all, and his trial counsel’s testimony did not 
actually show that Kubat said anything on the subject.  (See generally 7/13/16 Tr.)  
Kubat’s trial counsel merely testified that a friend of Kubat informed him after the trial 
that Kubat ran because he had marijuana in his pocket and he did not want it to be 
found on him.  (Tr., pp.17, L.20 – p.18, L.3.)  Kubat’s trial counsel testified that he later 
“talked to Mr. Kubat and said, ‘Why didn’t you tell me about that?  That would have 
explained to the jury why you ran,’ and then I would have probably had him take the 
                                            
10  Even if true, having marijuana in his pocket does not “preclude” the likelihood that 
Kubat ran because he was aware of the methamphetamine in his house. 
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stand for that purpose.”  (Tr., p.18, Ls.4-8.)  There was no testimony about what, if 
anything, Kubat said in response.  In short, the foundational “fact” of Kubat’s argument 
is missing – the record does not reflect any statement by him, vis-à-vis an inference that 
he told a friend, that he ran because he had marijuana in his pocket.  Because the 
record is devoid of what Kubat himself would have actually testified to at trial, Kubat’s 
argument does not undermine the state’s case at trial in the least.     
 Kubat next argues that, had he testified, he could have told the jury about “his 
blindness,” which “would have rebutted the state’s theory that the ledger was his, as he 
could not see well enough to use it.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)  However, there was no 
evidence or testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, and none cited on appeal, 
that supports Kubat’s claim that he would not have been able to maintain a ledger due 
to poor sight.  (See generally Tr.)  Because this argument is based on mere conjecture 
and speculation, it does not disturb the overwhelming evidence presented at trial of 
Kubat’s guilt.   
 Based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial, this Court should 
conclude that, beyond a reasonable doubt, any violation of Kubat’s due process right to 
testify at trial did not contribute to his conviction and was harmless.  Rossignol, 152 
Idaho at 704, 274 P.3d at 5. 
 
  
21 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order, 
following an evidentiary hearing, dismissing Kubat’s post-conviction petition. 
 DATED this 14th day of March, 2017. 
 
 
 
      _/s/ John C. McKinney_______ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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